Cambridge University Journal, European Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, 155-176 r 2010 Academia Europea

Using statistical techniques and original data, we focus on the representatives coming from the most recent EU member state (i.e. Romania) as activity differences are most likely to occur at their level. Results indicate that, in essence, the socialization with the EP workings (duration of term in office) considerably shapes newcomers' performance. (full article can be downloaded here). 

By looking at the first mandate of the Romanian MEPs, our bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate two factors that determine the extent of the MEPs' activity: the number of months in office and their status (elected versus appointed). Although we have disaggregated the level of activity in four components, the results are highly consistent. Thus, the affiliation to the EP group partially explains attendance, a relationship that disappears when we check for all other variables. Aware that the time period is very short, these results indicate the behaviour of legislators at the beginning of their mandate, when facing a wholly new experience. The major implications of our results are both theoretical and empirical. First, there is the importance of socialization and continuity for a sustainable activity.
 
Drafting and amending reports and giving speeches are heavily influenced by this variable. Thus, MEPs and leaders of their national parties should consider fighting for longer terms in office in the EP if they want to become more visible through their activity. Second, elected MEPs usually perform better than those appointed. It is true that the blocked PR list system that works for the EU elections in Romania diminishes the difference between appointment and election.
Major parties, after observing election polls, decide the order of the candidates and basically appoint specific individuals to the eligible seats.
 
However, we may argue that at a psychological level the responsibility of an elected MEP is greater than that of an appointee, and that this will lead them do be more active. Third, we have set the empirical bases for further research in the unexplored field of MEPs' activity. The two variables that explain differences in the performance of Romanian MEPs may be successfully employed in comparative studies. By adding more similar cases (countries) to the picture and conducting a comparative study, the robustness of these relationships can be tested. Thus, the limits of socialization for activity in office can be asserted and identified if the difference made by the election is valid solely for the inexperienced MEPs.

S E R G I U GHERGHINA, University of Leiden, Department of Political Science, The Netherlands and DORU FRANTESCU European Institute for Participatory Democracy Qvorum, and VoteWatch CIC